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‘There were our own, there were the others [. . .] why should I not sing them?’1 
questions the first elegy in the Scottish poet-solider Hamish Henderson’s Elegies 
for the Dead in Cyrenacia. The imperative to commit acts of remembrance during 
and after the events of a war is an ancient one, and intrinsically linked to what 
Paul Connerton calls the ‘ethics of memory’,2 a moral obligation to remember 
past people and events. Indeed, the majority of the action of Homer’s Iliad could 
be read as stemming from the moral obligation to remember, which we see 
work in different ways: from Achilles’s raging vengeance, Andromache’s keening 
anticipation of the death of her husband, and Priam’s negotiations in mourn-
ing for Hector, to Nestor’s meditated advice born out of experience of previous 
wars, and the funeral games of Patroclus. The action of the Iliad and its relation 
to memory and remembrance, as in many people’s memories of the wars of the 
last century and beyond, stem from a concern for one’s own, predicated on the 
allies versus enemies model of conventional, or ‘symmetric’, warfare. However, 
in Henderson’s lines we see concern for all people, nations and perspectives who 
have been affected by conflict (in Henderson’s case, African, British and German), 
and, as the elegies go on, this extends to a concern for all those who have been 
affected by any conflict.
The global memorial concern of Henderson’s poet-speaker is a prelude to several 
of the concerns surrounding the idea of responsible remembrance, or the inter-
play of just memory and just conflict. The field of conflict has changed radically 
from that of previous ages, boundaries are increasingly blurred between nation 
states, the interpretations of what constitute ‘good’ and ‘evil’ acts of war are 
confused, and the tradition of Hellenic militarism of which Achilles, Priam and 
Hector provide a hybrid archetype is fast dissolving. We are thus led increasingly 
to ask who and what it is appropriate to remember, and how it is appropriate to 
remember them. War-remembrance models now no longer fall neatly into the 
themes of either Dunbar’s timor mortis (war experience as a reminder of the frailty 
of human life) or Horace’s aere perennis (the elegiac monument built to everlast-
ingly celebrate the lives of soldiers). And, as Marc Augé writes, the duty to forget 
is often as important as the duty to remember; there are unethical or inappropri-
ate notes struck by many national acts of remembrance now which ‘contort the 
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hideous shape of the unspeakable [. . .] into the banalities of ordinary mediocrity 
[beautifying] death and horror’.3 We meet a paradox wherein the consolation 
offered by forgetting (or remembering) acts of war operates simultaneously with 
the unacceptability of forgetting (or remembering) these same acts. In order to 
even begin to address these inquietudes, it is important to look first at the differ-
ent ways in which memory and remembrance functions in relation to contempo-
rary conflict on both personal and international levels.
Memory, as we have seen across this collection of essays, is intimately connected 
to the way we constitute our selves. This can be seen in the impulse to collect 
objects or in an accretion of autobiographical memories. As we have seen even 
in this book, in the section on the Digital, memory works, too, in the conscious 
editing of good / bad, true / false memories in our online and offline ‘selves’, as 
a battle waged against forgetting, in the prosthetisation of the brain’s capacity 
to remember into the digital archive and in the use of online remembering tools 
or programmes. Memories of various types also influence physical development, 
skill-attributes and the way we interact with our environment. In line with the 
digitally self-constitutive memory acts here, various commentators on contempo-
rary warfare and the ethics of soldiering pay close attention to the disaffection or 
distancing between the soldier and his humanity produced by the advances in the 
digital technologies of war. Other commentators have noted the increased appli-
cation of affective interaction in the counterinsurgency work which forms a solid 
foundation for contemporary techniques of war. Although seemingly opposed, 
the disaffective and the affective schools of thought both work towards the same 
thing: an up-to-date ethics of warfare which takes into account all of the possible 
implications for humanity of the ways in which war is waged today.
Christopher Coker’s Warrior Geeks (2013) maps the rise and demise of the 
Homeric warrior-figure in Western military thought alongside the rise of the 
 ‘warrior geek’ – the ‘cyber-’ or ‘cubicle-’ warrior,4 who fights a depersonalised 
online battle in a cyberspace environment, purposefully disconnected from the 
human reality of war due to the psychological and physical toll of the violent 
experiences and difficult ethical choices it involves. The dissociation of the ‘war-
rior geek’ is a radically different one from that of Achilles in his thymotic rage, 
where he is disaffected by the pleas of his peers and his elders, and mercilessly 
disconnected from any person that stands in his way. Peter Sloterdijk writes that 
in his rage Achilles becomes a ‘complete warrior’. His rage is completely external-
ised, and in possession of the ultimate clarity of mission he no longer possesses 
an inner (morally reflective, remembering) life: ‘Fog arises, yet shapes become 
more determinate. Now clear lines lead to the object. The enraged attack knows 
where it wants to hit. [He] “enters the world like the bullet enters the battle”’.5 
The ‘complete’ warrior geek, however, is physically and psychologically detached 
from the object of his attack. The opposite of Achilles in his berserker-like fury, 
his or her dissociation is effective in its affectlessness.
The drone and its pilot is the logical, scientised conclusion to nearly a century 
of distance-wars. For a century, the technologies of warfare have increasingly 
addressed a problem oft-cited by scholars of the Second World War: that in the 
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heat of battle only 15–20 percent of allied soldiers actually fired their weapons, 
the personal ethical decision to not kill overcoming the international message of 
the war being a just war, a war for humanity against evil. In this case, remember-
ing responsibly in Henderson’s sense is exactly the sort of memory which, in the 
heat of action, could cost soldiers their sanity, their jobs, and even their lives. This 
statistic did not go unnoticed for long, and a revolution in Western military train-
ing took place aimed at desensitising soldiers to their targets. Practice dummies 
were for the first time made human-shaped in the hope that in the heat of battle 
soldiers would forget Mark’s commandment to love your neighbour as yourself 
(Chapter 12, Verse 31), and the tenth commandment, and learnt to disassociate 
the image of a human enemy from their own humanity. Equally, military technol-
ogies were developed to put as much as possible physical distance between soldier 
and target. As Susan Neiman writes, ‘resistance to killing someone decreases in 
direct proportion to distance from them’.6 A manipulation of memory takes place 
whereby the soldier is taught to be desensitised and to forget the human nature 
of a target, whilst at the same time he or she is taught to espouse a (completely 
human) bond of brotherhood with fellow soldiers. The most important memory 
in this case is the development of and ability to use niche skill-attributes.
The effective affective distancing of the complete warrior geek is achieved 
through a feat of distancing, deferral and derealisation. They exist in an environ-
ment where warfare is made to be ‘like a videogame’,7 their battle-view is taken 
on by a co-pilot, who analyses real-time footage of the object of attack, and their 
decisions are taken on by an operations team. A senior officer will, on advice, 
give the final word as to whether a strike will or will not take place. Elements that 
make up the psyche of the conventional soldier are now split between a team 
of many, and the drone pilot’s use of memory/experience as an effective moral 
indicator is eradicated; his or her experience of war in the ‘online’ context will 
bear almost no resemblance to the war memories of the ‘offline’ soldier, which are 
often saturated with emotions ranging from boredom to disgust, fear, exhaustion 
and terror, memories which have been instrumental in the formation of legal and 
ethical approaches to warfare. Indeed, the strength of the cybersoldier lies in his 
or her lack of proximity to and lack of memory formation regarding warfare: logic 
and nondeclarative memory prevail in the online war environment, and decision-
making processes are abdicated to a dedicated chain of command structure.
It does not take Pavolvian experimentation, Hebbian theory or Freudian psy-
choanalysis to tell us that it is proximity to and affective engagement with warfare 
that leads to the most productive and ethical remembrances of war. It is possible, 
and often therapeutic, to mourn and to celebrate through acts of remembrance 
lives lost and injuries suffered by known individuals engaged in warfare, just as 
it is possible to decry the violence done through war to ‘our own’ and ‘the oth-
ers’. War memorials in poetry and stone are often built around list upon list of 
names, dates and places. But how is it possible to encompass in these acts of 
remembrance the disassociated, disaffective warrior geek, so far from human 
engagement with an enemy as to render the human elements of warfare (name, 
date, place) almost negligible? The soldier for whom warfare is ‘fucking cool’, 
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‘like a videogame’,8 and who has restricted decision-making power, has nothing 
important to recall  regarding their status as combatant: nothing to remember or 
to be remembered by.
In contrast to the ultra-modern, ultra-online, purposefully disaffected and 
 un-remembering cyber-soldier, is the figure of the counterinsurgent soldier, 
another product of twenty-first-century warfare. The counterinsurgent differs 
as radically from the affect-riddled external-facing Homeric warrior as does the 
warrior-geek. However, where the cyber-soldier works in an infrastructure of 
disaffection and non-proximity where nondeclarative memory skills are used 
and soldiers are shielded from using and constructing declarative memories, the 
counterinsurgent is a finely-tuned grass-roots level warrior of ‘hearts and minds’, 
trained to take accountability, and to build on knowledge of a given situation 
through experience and memory. The counterinsurgent warrior wages war within 
the context of what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri label as the ‘armed police 
work’ of a contemporary style of war which operates as part of a global system of 
‘affective industries’.9
War is no longer a question of winning territory, but of sharing space and infor-
mation, and winning the trust and understanding of communities. By dint of their 
proximity to potential hostile forces, through working within communities and 
patrolling and sharing their space, any conflict experienced by the counterinsur-
gent soldier will be immediate, direct and kinetic, with sometimes horrific casual-
ties. These soldiers learn efficacy from proximity (just as the cyber-soldier operates 
effectively through distance); declarative memory is a major element of the way 
in which they wage war, as memories of incidents and effective psychogeographic 
mapping of space are major factors in strategy formation. The war memories thus 
developed can be as much to do with gaining trust of ‘the others’ as they can be 
of the work done with one’s own soldiers, or of fighting, bomb-disposal, and the 
frustration of the ‘courageous restraint’ which made David Petraeus’s doctrines of 
counterinsurgency so effective. Soldiers’ descriptions of operational tours often 
involve the bombastic statistic that they are 98 percent boredom and two percent 
adrenaline. In spite of the boredoms and frustrations, the counterinsurgent is a 
soldier finely-tuned to the national, international and personal ramifications of 
his decisions. What better reflection of Henderson’s memorial phrase than this?
Soldiers thus return from contemporary conflicts having waged very different 
sorts of warfare, and formed radically different memories from their experiences 
of war. Both elicit very different responses from a thinking public regarding the 
ethics of war and of remembrance. A cenotaph built with Horace’s monument 
‘more lasting than bronze’ is no longer wholly appropriate. It is not feasible to 
perform week-long funeral games for each fallen warrior as in Homeric times, nor 
can an exhaustive catalogue of injuries inflicted and suffered be made. Equally, 
the anti-war (or pro-peace) protest commemorates the other side of warfare, bring-
ing to the foreground the problem of the ethics of remembrance as well as of war. 
How can the memories of current conflicts be transmuted appropriately into some 
form of remembrance? What, now, are the ethics which underlie the ‘imperative’ 
to remember?
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When Adorno wrote in his now oft-cited, and frequently decontextualised, 
essay ‘Cultural Criticism and Society’, that ‘to write poetry after Auschwitz is 
barbaric’,10 he was commenting in part on the ethics of remembrance; the ‘hid-
eous shape of the unspeakable’ that Augé sees so many national monuments 
assume. There is a difficult dialectic which operates when national and personal 
monuments to memory come under question, between barbarism and culture, the 
individual and the state, the morally correct and the hierarchically sanctioned, 
all within the political, global contexts in which the ethics of remembrance also 
tread softly. The global cultural memory must still take into account the cultural 
barbarism of the concentration camps of WW2, the ethically disastrous nationally 
implemented repression or prescriptive forgetting of the Japanese military atroci-
ties perpetrated on the Sino-Russian border in WW2, or, more recently, the sup-
pression of knowledge regarding the activities which took place in the Abu Ghraib 
or Guantanamo Bay detention camps, just as a therapeutic personal forgetting of 
various acts of war must also take place.
Without a complete sense of ‘just’ war, ‘just’ remembrance cannot take place, 
and a monument ‘more lasting than bronze’ must be unshakeably morally just in 
its foundations and constructions. But in an age fascinated by ‘survivor accounts’ 
and driven by the moral importance of acts of testimony, we are apt to forget 
the responsibility of remembrance, which is often, as Shoshana Feldman notes, 
a solitary responsibility, and the frequently inaccurate and incomplete nature 
of testimony, as well as the moral ramifications of the distribution of its often 
difficult subject-matter.11 In this context, Jeffrey Blustein is right to question the 
morality of memory and forgetting, since just as not all memory is accurate or 
just, not all forgetting is prescriptive or repressive: 
in our contemporary post-Holocaust world, where memory, however painful 
its content or contexts, is prized, socially sanctioned, and even sanctified, there 
is understandable reluctance in many quarters to seriously take up the matter 
of forgetting and to consider what value it may have.12 
Equally, with so many ‘witnesses’ and ‘survivors’, so many perspectives on ‘our 
own’ and ‘the others’, acts of remembrance on both personal and national scales 
will always be incomplete. These are what Mieke Bal sees as some of memory’s 
‘many tricks’,13 and what Christopher Coker calls the ‘treachery’ of memory.14
It is therapeutic for the soldier returning from war to participate in acts of 
remembrance, even to write documents of witness of his or her experiences, 
just as it is therapeutic for the families of the injured or lost to mourn and 
to rail against the conflict. Yet remembrance is a double-edged sword. It is 
dangerous, through acts of remembrance, to fetishize the figure of the warrior 
or the idea of war, or the figure of the survivor and the apparently authentic 
document of testimony. It is dangerous, too, to not remember enough, and 
thus disable the remembrance process that is necessary to the formation of 
moral and ethical judgments and ‘good’ or ‘just’ acts. How, then, is it possible, 
with the centenary of the Great War looming as we write this, to remember 
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responsibly? And how far and wide must this net of appropriate remembrance 
be cast? These are the questions which have informed this piece of writing, and 
which, although they may well not have any hard and fast final answer, are the 
imperative  foundation – and capstones – to every act of remembrance which 
now takes place.
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